Enforcement of law and constitutional convention

An attempt to bridge the gap between law enforcement and compliance with Constitutional Conventions needs to be reviewed, particularly in terms of the extent to which customs determine an individual's legal rights and obligations.1

To this end, one case2 will be considered, where it may be judged that the degree of related agreements could infringe upon the legal status of non-political actors.

In Attorney General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd.,2 the Attorney General secured a ruling that government confidentiality could, in principle, be protected by breach of confidence. It should be discussed whether this additional factor, decided in favour of the Attorney General, was crucial in granting him judgment on the general issue. It is possible that the principles of collective responsibility had a decisive influence on the outcome, and in this case, the Constitutional Court's "execution" is parasitic on attributing an uncertain degree of rights and obligations to conventions so far.3

Allen stated, “… To recognise a convention is necessarily to endorse the principle which justifies it; and, in a context where legal doctrine is developed to reflect that principle, recognition means enforcement.” Recognition implies judicial approval, and it is viewed as a rule of practice based on political principles.4

Consequently, recognition of a convention supports the principle that justifies it, and recognition equates to enforcement in contexts where legal doctrine is developed to reflect that principle.5 However, it is problematic that in such cases the standards of conduct, including those of judges, can be broadly interpreted by extrapolating from the occasional recognition of constitutional conventions.

References

  1. Joseph Jaconelli, “Do constitutional conventions bind?” (2005) Cambridge Law Journal https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/IFB1DF740E72A11DC88EB9BE684C867E2 accessed 15 January 2022
  2. [1975] Q.B. 752
  3. Ibid
  4. T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford, 1993), p.244
  5. Ibid