Blog
I created this space to explore and share valuable insights into the complex world of law. Here, you'll find articles on legal developments, case analyses, practical advice, and commentary.
I created this space to explore and share valuable insights into the complex world of law. Here, you'll find articles on legal developments, case analyses, practical advice, and commentary.
The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the CJEU's jurisdiction, clarified EU law supremacy, and redefined EU structure and objectives, shifting the Union's focus from primarily economic goals to broader values like peace, security, democracy, and human rights.
EU law, grounded in the goal of a unified market and upheld by the CJEU, prioritizes free movement and the supremacy of EU legislation over national laws, relying on member state compliance and enforcement mechanisms to address conflicts and ensure consistent application across the EU.
The CJEU's approach to EU citizens' entitlement to social benefits demonstrates its adaptability, as it interprets eligibility based on evolving legislative frameworks and specific case contexts to balance citizens' rights with the protection of host states' resources.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ensures uniform interpretation, application, and enforcement of EU law through a balanced judicial structure, preliminary rulings, enforcement actions, and the ability to review penalties and damages, thereby upholding legal certainty across the EU.
In Apthorpe v Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co (1899), the Court of Appeal held that an English parent company's attempt to evade U.S. property restrictions was a sham, applying the "head and brains" rule to pierce the corporate veil and make the parent liable for the subsidiary's obligations, focusing on actual control rather than the Salomon principle.
Before Adams v Cape Industries Ltd, conflicting rulings on piercing the corporate veil arose from DHN Food Distributors v Tower Hamlets, where the Court of Appeal allowed compensation by disregarding separate legal entities, and Woolfson v Strathclyde, where the House of Lords upheld strict adherence to the Salomon principle, limiting veil-piercing to cases of facade, though its influence in English courts remained debated.
The "agency" ground for piercing the corporate veil, as described by Slade LJ, applies in rare cases where a subsidiary is so controlled by its parent company that it lacks independent business operations, as seen in Smith, Stone and Knight v Birmingham Corp, where the court treated the subsidiary as part of the parent’s business, allowing the parent to claim compensation.
In Adams v Cape Industries plc, Slade LJ outlined two primary grounds for piercing the corporate veil—‘sham or facade’ and ‘agency’—where the courts may disregard a company’s separate legal personality, as demonstrated in cases like Gilford Motor Co v Horne and Jones v Lipman, where companies were found to be mere facades to avoid legal obligations.
The key issue in English company law is determining when courts can disregard a company’s separate legal personality, with evolving case law—from Salomon to Prest—defining conditions under which the corporate veil may be pierced, particularly in cases of fraud, sham, agency, or single economic units.
A company, as a distinct legal entity, can employ individuals, enter contracts, and face legal actions with limited liability for shareholders, though courts may lift the corporate veil in cases of fraud, illegality, or oppression to prevent misuse of the separate legal personality.
Unfair prejudice in company law involves courts balancing formal rights and equitable considerations, especially in quasi-partnerships where mutual trust permits broader recognition of shareholder expectations, unlike in public companies where strict adherence to formal provisions prevails.
Courts applying section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 assess unfair prejudice by balancing shareholder expectations against formal articles, focusing on concrete evidence of unfairness, especially in share value and valuation disputes.
Section 996 of the Companies Act 2006 empowers courts to provide relief for unfairly prejudicial conduct, including regulating company affairs, restraining prejudicial acts, ordering share purchases, and ensuring equitable treatment of minority shareholders.
In Re Saul D Harrison and Sons plc [1995], Hoffmann LJ clarifies that "unfairly prejudicial" conduct under section 994 of the Companies Act centers on assessing fairness within the commercial relationship and shareholders' legitimate expectations, extending beyond strict adherence to contractual terms.
The courts have gradually adopted a more flexible approach to statutory derivative actions, supported by alternative remedies like Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, to enhance protection and relief for minority shareholders facing corporate misconduct or oppression
Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 protects minority shareholders from unfairly prejudicial conduct without enabling forced share acquisition by the majority.
Courts assess unfairly prejudicial conduct by weighing directors' actions against shareholder expectations, with intervention depending on specific case circumstances.
O'Neill v Phillips [1999] emphasizes that unfair prejudice remedies under Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 should consider both the articles and shareholders' legitimate expectations for equitable protection of minority interests.